Hacia una comprensión de las políticas exteriores en América Latina: tópicos, casos y enfoques preliminares.

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Understanding Latin American Foreign Policies:

In this chapter, I argue that changes in the world have introduced new elements in international relations today which need to be examined carefully in the context of their foreign policy relevance. Specifically, the phenomenon of globalization has engendered the following changes in foreign policy: 1) foreign policy is increasingly being formulated as public policy in the same way as other public policies characterized by the growing complexity of the international and domestic scene; 2) public and government agendas do not always coincide and the agenda of civil society is increasingly impinging on governmental public policy; 3) globalization has given rise to issues that are “intermestic,” that is, they span the domestic and international spheres; and 4) in this regard, the international agenda is an increasingly complex one where transnational actors of different characteristics (including non-state actors in the framework of the so called “complex multilateralism”) determine how the state implements public policies including foreign policy. In Latin America and the Caribbean, civil society influences at domestic, regional and international levels appear to be stronger than in the rest of the third world, primarily because of the strength of both the democratization movement and the movement toward regional and hemispheric integration. I therefore suggest that foreign policy analysis of this region must now incorporate various perspectives on civil society, especially regional civil society. But before I discuss these points in greater detail, I wish to review the main currents in Latin American foreign policy theorizing so as to provide a context for my arguments. The main questions raised in this section are: a) How have Latin American foreign policy studies emerged and developed in the past? b) What approaches and theoretical principles have sustained them and contributed to foreign policy studies in Latin America and the Caribbean? c) What is the effect on the study of Latin American foreign policy of the transforming dynamic imposed by globalization?

Before trying to address these questions, it would be useful to make some conceptual clarifications. First, in order to reflect faithfully the status of foreign policy research in as opposed to just about Latin America, I have limited myself to predominantly Latin American sources. Although many of the approaches and views considered here may be, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced by concepts from other cultural, academic, and political contexts, it is important to emphasize their processing and use in a more specific framework and in terms of the requirements and particularities of Latin American foreign policies during a half-century. In this regard, starting in the 1970s, studies of Latin America’s international relations underwent significant development, which was not matched by a similar development of foreign policy studies. This imbalance generated “an unequal coverage and quality” (Van Klaveren 1984: 2).

Second, it is also important to acknowledge the difference between the study of international relations and the study of foreign policy in the Latin American context. As Van Klaveren notes: “Although the distinction between the analysis of foreign policy and international relations is often confused and ignored, it seems valid and appropriate in the Latin American case. While the former mainly involves conduct inside a country directed or related to its external medium, the latter centers on the processes of interaction involving at least two units of the international system (Van Klaveren: 1992: 174).

According to this distinction, foreign policy can be seen as a public policy (Nohlen and Fernandez, 1990: 2-3) and consequently considered as a specific field of political science, whereas the study of international relations, in my opinion, operates in a different framework and requires its own methodology and approach. For his part, Tomassini adds, in relation to Latin American countries, that

The most dangerous illusion has been to confuse the study of international relations with the study of the foreign policy of the countries, particularly in relation to nations in which the latter is naturally weak, and in which dependency on the external framework is high, as in developing countries. At the same time, the optical error of isolating the analysis of foreign policy with respect to the international context distorts the analysis and seriously compromises the usefulness of the prescriptions that could be derived from it (Tomassini 1985: 217-218).

1 “A term coined by Manning in an article in Foreign Affairs (1977) specifically in the context of American foreign policy. The author was seeking to encapsulate the extent to which traditional boundaries between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ issues had broken down in contemporary analysis. The expression may be separated from its American origins to achieve wider applicability wherever policy making in pluralistic communities involves issue areas that amalgamate actors from domestic/international contexts.”, Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham (1999): Dictionary of International Relations, London: Penguin, p. 258.
However, as we will see later, it is not always easy to differentiate between the development of these two fields in Latin America, for they generally overlap.

In the third place, this last consideration brings us to the need to establish in the Latin American case a clear distinction between the study and analysis of foreign policy, and its formulation and execution. Although both respond to a complex web of internal and external factors, the former relates to an academic dimension that began to emerge in the 1970s with a series of initiatives and activities aimed at establishing a specific field of study and analysis of foreign policy (Van Klaveren 1984: 2), often linked to the development of political science and international relations as disciplines in the Latin American academic context. In contrast, formulation and execution are linked to the traditional processes of implementation of foreign policy in Latin American states, whose roots date back to their establishment as independent states and relate to phases prior to World War II. In this respect, and keeping in mind the particularities of each case, the situation of states that achieved independence in the early part of the nineteenth century is different from that of the English-speaking Caribbean states, whose decolonization began in the 1960s. Although before and especially immediately after World War II, Latin America was largely isolated in the international context (Tomassini 1985: 201-204), the existence of specific policies in relations with the United States, European countries, or other Latin American states implied the emergence of incipient modalities of foreign policy. In this regard, the relationship between the studies and approaches developed in the academic field, and implementation of foreign policy in each country and region are in contrast to the “revolving door” image of the U.S. context, especially in relations between academics and practitioners (see Serbin 1996 for an elaboration).

Fourth, apart from the link between external and internal factors, the models of formulation and implementation of foreign policy in Latin America do not follow a single general pattern. Although common cultural traits (particularly evident in similar political cultures) can contribute to the identification of common features from a comparative point of view, in reality differences of size, political history, configuration, resources, and the role of decisive actors and international capacity allow clear distinctions to be made among national foreign policies. It is not by any chance that the foreign policies of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, or Cuba on the international and hemispheric scenes are more relevant than the policies of the Central American countries.

Finally, one should resist the ethnocentric temptation to homogenize the performance of Latin American foreign policies in the context of Latin America and the third world in general, not even taking into account the difficulties of operating with such a vague concept as “third world,” which in any event has been surpassed by international events. Again, Van Klaveren (1984: 2-3) is cautious about the generalizability of Latin American policy processes:

First, a minimum requirement for any general approach in the social sciences is a reasonable degree of universality, in the sense that the approach is applicable to more than a few cases. Second, the foreign policy-making process of several Latin American countries is fairly complex and sophisticated, and there is no practical reason to give it a unique status. [But] third, it could well be argued that just as Latin American processes are very different from, say, North American ones, they are also far apart from those prevailing in other Third World regions, if only because the internal political and economic environments in which they function are also radically different (Van Klaveren 1984: 2-3).

However, as he adds in a more recent work, “the development of foreign policy studies in Latin America has not led to the emergence of a new singular and specific approach adapted to the reality of the region or to developing countries in general” (Van Klaveren 1992: 173).

Foreign Policy Studies in Latin America: A Review

Between the wars, the debate between idealists and realists in the field of international relations had its effect on the development of the discipline and on the foreign policies of Latin American countries. As Russell

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2 Tomassini speaks about the “strategic loneliness” which characterized Latin America’s role in hemispheric relations in the stage after World War up to the beginning of the Cold War. He terms this “the conversion of Latin America into a strategically solitary place” (Tomassini 1985: 204).

3 Van Klaveren sums up the approach as follows (1992: 187): “In its most extreme versions, crude and simplistic, this perspective led to the conviction that Latin American underdevelopment was a direct consequence of the development of rich economies and it could only be overcome by revolutionary change (Frank, 1967; Dos Santos, 1978). In its more sophisticated versions, it argues that Latin American structural dependency with regard to external markets and capital limits and distorts the capitalist development of the region. However, it does not make it impossible (Cardoso and Falletto 1969; Muñoz 1978 and 1981).”
notes, in that period most Latin American authors were inclined to idealism, more in its Kantian rationalist than its Kantian aspect (Russell 1992: 8). Russell gives three reasons for this inclination: a) emphasis on law and international institutions and the idea that states are part of an “international society”; b) professional training linked to the legal profession and/or diplomacy; and c) the understanding that the law was the ideal instrument for protection from intervention by the central states. The predominance of this approach led to an obvious juridical bias and eventually to an “excessive formalism” in the studies since authors and analysts had more links with political than academic life.

On the other hand, the adherents of realism, particularly in the Southern Cone, used basically a geopolitical approach. Realist analyses, however, were fewer in number than those using the rationalist-Grotian viewpoint (Russell 1992: 9). Even so, both approaches, which were more related to the exercise of policy than to an academic view, tended to reflect the foreign policy priorities of Latin American countries in that period: relations with the great powers, first with Europe and later with the United States, and the relations with neighboring states, frequently marked by territorial disputes and tensions.

The end of World War II and the development of the Cold War immersed Latin American countries in the strategic dynamic imposed on the hemisphere by the United States, with the region’s consequent isolation. In the 1950s and 1960s, along with the persistence of juridical-normative studies, new theoretical approaches began to emerge, which laid the bases for the later development of a more systematic and empirical approach. In this regard, Russell identifies three predominant approaches: the influence of the “realist school” through U.S. and British authors; the emergence of the theory of dependence; and the further development of studies of a geopolitical matrix (Russell 1992: 10-11). In the Latin American case, the characteristics of the development of these three approaches need clarification. The influence of the realist school was expressed through what Russell terms “peripheral realism,” since realist assumptions were used as a tool for the incorporation of a series of specific considerations about the peripheral situation of Latin American states in the international scene, with very explicit references “to regional integration and cooperation as the most appropriate ways to thaw world power” (Russell 1992: 10). This was particularly evident in a period that covered the emergence of the Andean Pact and the development of the bases of Central American integration. The development of the second approach was influenced by “Cepalism” (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC) thinking, principally promoted by Raul Prebisch of Argentina who was very close to this position, and by the early development of “teoria de la dependencia” (dependency theory) in relation to the insertion of Latin American countries in the world capitalist system under conditions of dependence and asymmetry. This development took place in the context of a broad range of tendencies and emphases with respect to relations between the “center” and the “periphery,” and the characteristics that a peripheral development of endogenous traits should assume. In turn, the geopolitical approach combined elements of classic geopolitical doctrines with the doctrines of hemispheric security that evolved with the Cold War, principally through contributions by military authors who “take the geopolitical matrix as one of the principal determinants of foreign policy and not as an analytical tool for examination of the same” (Russell 1992: 11).

These three approaches, which predominated in the 1950s and 1960s, are seen by some Latin American authors as the components of the “foundational period” of foreign policy studies. They still contain many elements of normative theory and very few of empirical theory. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the theoretical and institutional conditions were forged for a more systematic development and empirical basis for foreign policy studies. This phase generally coincided with an intensifying search for the autonomous aspects of Latin American foreign policy, breaking with the isolation and the dynamic of hemispheric security imposed by the Cold War.

In the first place, social sciences in Latin America began to develop significantly, as illustrated by the creation in 1968 of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO). Although the Council focused its attention on the internal problems inherent to the development of Latin American societies, it paved the way for a theoretically solid and more systematic academic discussion, which in turn resulted in the inclusion of international relations in this field at the beginning of the 1980s (Tomassini 1985: 205-206). In this respect, the boom in social sciences prompted “a growing application of a politological [sic] perspective to foreign policy studies and a criticism of studies based on juridical perspectives or on geopolitical assumptions” (Russell 1992: 12).

Second, a series of important spaces begin to open for discussion and development in the field of international relations, as well as in the debate on foreign policy. The Institute of International Studies was created by the University of Chile in 1967 (which started the publication of the journal Estudios Internacionales, with significant regional influence). The Latin American Forum was established in 1974, and the Joint
Studies Program on International Relations of Latin America (RIAL) began in 1977. Schools of international relations and research institutes were set up with links to academic institutions, frequently related to the development of the theory of international relations in the United States, and to the education of a new generation of researchers and analysts in U.S. schools (Perina 1985; Russell 1992).

These processes created the conditions for what some authors term the “boom” in international studies in Latin America in the 1980s, and the emphasis, mostly based on theoretical baggage of U.S. origin, on investigation of little researched aspects of foreign policy. This stage is characterized by the following features:

- most of the authors are academics;
- they work with a more well defined and precise analytical universe, with explicit theoretical and methodological assumptions in the studies;
- there is a clear concern for making “empirical theory,” for finding nexuses of causality between the selected variables and establishing causal priorities;
- approaches developed in the United States are applied, starting fundamentally in the 1970s (especially Allison’s bureaucratic policy model, Keohane and Nye’s matrix of complex interdependence, and to a lesser extent approaches on ideologies, images, and perceptions by authors like Jervis or George; and on decision-making processes, based on the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin);
- an effort was made to “construct theory” from the periphery (Russell 1992: 14).

To some extent, this process was based at the beginning of the 1980s with the development of dependency theory which attempted to break with Marxist orthodoxy and to construct innovative schemes in an effort to interpret the development of capitalism in the periphery. Although it is recognized that this approach was never conceived as a theory to explain foreign policy, before and during the “boom” it was an important reference in the regional debate on the different interpretations of international relations.

Simultaneously, one of the decisive elements in the development of the “boom” was the creation and evolution of the Joint Studies Program on the International relations of Latin America (RIAL). The RIAL was created as an association of Latin American academic institutions, specializing in the study of the foreign relations of their respective countries, with the aim of stimulating joint work between member centers. Each year, the RIAL promoted the formation of a number of work groups by researchers from member centers to analyze a particular subject. RIAL then evaluated and supported the proposals formulated by the different groups, arranged regular meetings to discuss the progress of their research, and published their results in a series that was centralized by the Grupo Editor Latinoamericano (GEL) in Buenos Aires. Many members of the RIAL also participated in the Latin American Forum when it emerged as an opinion group in the mid-seventies, and in the 1990s occupied important ministerial and diplomatic posts involving the implementation of foreign policy in their countries.

The RIAL perceived the usefulness of an annual report of a more global nature, in parallel with the studies done by the work groups in the subject area chosen by them. The report reviewed trends in the international system in each period from a Latin American angle and outlined the implications they could have for the countries of the region. As its secretary general said at the time:

From the start, we wanted to avoid a report with a fixed or recurring content. Its analysis is centered on a subject of particular relevance to the appreciation of the state of international relations each year. As a result, reports have analyzed a wide range of issues: the possibility of a new era of U.S. hegemony; the international impact of the third industrial revolution; the systems of formulation of the foreign policy of the more recently developed countries; and relations between Europe and Latin America. (Tomassini 1989: 13-14).

These activities of the RIAL, with regular meetings and discussion of the work groups and the publication of the yearbook, lasted until the early 1990s. They generated intense contacts and interaction between researchers and centers all over Latin America and the Caribbean and were a fundamental landmark in the development of the study of international relations and foreign policy in the region. A preliminary assessment of the activity of the RIAL reveals the stimulus it gave to international relations as an academic discipline; its contribution to the modernization of the study; the links forged with relevant Latin American issues and broad and equilibrated approaches; the promotion of academic, ideological and generational and

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4 Reference is to Allison 1971; Keohane and Nye 1977; Jervis 1976; George 1969; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1954.
5 RIAL disappeared in the 1990s. One of the reasons was financial constraints; other factors were related to the establishment of democracy in different Latin American countries and the increasing involvement of some of RIAL’s individual members in political activities in their own countries. Among members who went on to hold political positions were Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas who became Venezuela’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Miguel Insulza (who held the same position in Chile), and Rosario Green who became Secretary of International Relations of Mexico.
geographical pluralism; and finally the effort to develop a discourse in all these activities in which “academics, men of government and the representatives of the nongovernmental sector understood each other” (Tomassini 1985: 219-220).

In addition to the activities of RIAL and the meetings of Latin American specialists in international relations and foreign policy since 1984, the Follow-up Program of Latin American Foreign Policies (PROSPEL) was established in Chile. This program also published until 1993 a Yearbook of Latin American Foreign Policies, reflecting much of the research and empirical follow-up of the foreign policies of Latin America and the Caribbean. As the last PROSPEL publication stated, it was a response to two essential needs of the development of international studies in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean: “first, development of a systematic analysis of foreign policies adopted by the countries of the region, and second, promotion in this study of a Latin American perspective of the international affairs of the continent” (Heine 1993: 6).

Along with the development of programs like the RIAL and PROSPEL, the 1980s were characterized by the establishment and proliferation of schools of international relations, private centers, and research institutes associated with universities. Journals and publications in the field of international relations and foreign policy studies also contributed to the “boom” in the region (Perina 1985), and a network and epistemic community was progressively formed (Serbin 1996).

The advances in the analysis and study of foreign policy were made possible by the developments in the field of international relations as an academic discipline, and the growing separation between the juridical approaches and political science. In this respect, it is important to mention first, the mutual enrichment of the two fields, notwithstanding the difficulties in their delimitation in more recent Latin American experience; and second, despite the transformations, the persistence of the fluctuation between the descriptive and prescriptive levels of foreign policy studies, and the urgent need to move forward with explanatory and comparative studies in this field (Van Klaveren 1984:2).

In terms of systematic studies, a useful typology of predominant approaches to foreign policy analysis in Latin America was proposed by Van Klaveren in 1984. In classifying approaches, he assumed, with anticipation, that the forces of transnationalism “tend to make them less clear-cut than they [were] in the past” (p. 3). In his classification, he grouped among the “perspectives on external sources of foreign policies” the approaches emphasizing international system, power politics, and dependency and external reliance. In the section on “perspectives on domestic sources of foreign policy,” he placed works on “regime orientation,” “decision-making and domestic policies,” “bureaucratic politics” and “leadership,” pointing out that they had received less attention in Latin America. In a later work (1992), he regrouped the perspectives on the external sources of foreign policy into two categories in order to create a framework for the analysis of foreign policy in Latin America: the international system (including the theory of dependence) and power politics. At the same time, he re-stated the perspectives of domestic sources of foreign policy, including works on the political system, development strategy, historical and cultural factors, actors and decisionmaking, and resources. The changes are illustrative of the transformations in both the international and domestic environments, and their impact on the orientation of researchers and analysts in Latin America.

Overall, there has been a tendency to attribute many of the determinants of Latin American foreign policies to external factors. This is evidenced in the development of the different views of “dependency” (the importance of which has now significantly diminished), in the analysis of the international system, and possibly in the considerations on the sub-systemic character of international relations in Latin America (Atkins 1999). Both original “Cepalist” thinking and the dependence approaches have had “a clear impact on the study and practice of foreign policy” (Van Klaveren 1992 ?), although they do not specifically relate to it. In this sense, the “dependencia” approach, considered an approach to the theory of economic and political development and international political economy, has significantly influenced the perceptions of the political and intellectual elites of the region even if it was not directly related to the decision-making process in foreign policy.

This influence of this kind of thinking on scholars and policymakers has made them particularly sensitive to understanding the dynamics of the international system and the factors and actors involved, making possible a significant transition toward understanding the phenomenon of globalization, particularly in relation to the acceleration of the sub-regional, regional, and hemispheric integration processes in the 1990s and 2000s. For this reason, most of the studies on the international situation and its impact on foreign policy have been developing intensely on the Latin American scene. The topics of economic globalization, the insertion

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* Similar factors to those related to the disappearance of RIAL motivated the gradual disappearance of PROSPEL.
of Latin America into the international economic system, the role of regional integration processes, and more specific issues such as industrial and technological transformation, competitiveness, and trade and investment have permeated not only government agendas of the 2000s but also the research agendas of the region’s academics. The interdependence processes highlighted by some Latin American analysts (especially in Mexico), together with the 1990s-2000s “boom” in integration processes have resulted in more emphasis on elements of cooperation than on conflict, with a strong accent on the economic. This perspective has also affected issues of security, which in the 1990s began to be dealt with more on the basis of cooperation than antagonism (for example, see Pellicer 1995).

The renewed emphasis on economics today has generated a growing need to link the study of foreign policy with other policies in the economic area, on the assumption that the transnationalization processes affect the clear and sharp delimitation of domestic and external processes and require more complex and sophisticated approaches. Other non-economic linkages also need to be addressed: for example, the attention to regional and hemispheric integration also assumes new political, cultural, and social dimensions. Furthermore, the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation in most Latin American countries have resulted in a re-consideration of the domestic factors that influence the formulation and execution of foreign policy in Latin America. On the one hand there is the growing interrelation of these processes with external factors and, on the other, we now need more than ever to incorporate into the analysis factors such as political regimes, development strategies, historical and cultural factors (including political culture) which make each experience unique, the complexity of the set of actors in decision making in foreign policy, and the resources available. In this respect, along with the relevance of governance in relation to public policies (including foreign policy) which a state assumes in its relations with internal and external actors, the discourse and interest in foreign policy analysis have shifted toward a combination of political and economic variables as the prioritization of the economic factors has increased. More recently, there has been a shift as well toward social factors, often under the influence of the recommendations of international organizations and pressure from certain domestic sectors.

**Incorporating New Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Foreign Policy**

As noted, globalization imposes an increasingly stronger link between the internal and external factors that determine foreign policy, making it exceedingly difficult to establish a clear distinction between them, given the growing permeability of national frontiers resulting from transnationalization. To understand this process involves not only a rethinking of the role of the state, the limits of national sovereignty, and the predominance of the strategic and diplomatic elements associated with a traditional approach to foreign policy, but also consideration of the growing pressure on the state to transform itself into an “agent of globalization.” Consequently, the complex web of factors, processes, and external actors is woven through an increasingly complex and dynamic linkage of these elements at the internal level. It is not by chance that some Latin American analysts of foreign policy studies now include not only the characteristics of globalization in all its diverse facets (for example, Moneta and Quenan 1994) but also the problems of formulation of public policies and governance, returning to earlier observations on foreign policy as public policy (Tomassini 1991, 1993, 1996).

Increasingly, however, public policies are not dictated only by the government agenda, but are also related in the domestic area to a public agenda. These processes are occurring in the context of a reformulation of relations between state and civil society, particularly in processes of re-democratization or democratic consolidation. Civil society is increasing its influence on public policy through the dynamic of the market with the participation of business and labor sectors; through consumer groups with their own demands and agendas; through actors in the informal economy - micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, small farmers and cooperativists; and through nongovernmental organizations of associative or philanthropic type. Again to cite Tomassini, the linking of the governmental and public agendas basically requires the building of a consensus for decision-making, which will have a positive effect on governance. (Tomassini 1993).

In the context of globalization and the external pressures associated with intermestic processes, government and public agendas, which do not always coincide, also need to be related to an increasingly complex international agenda, where transnational and non-state actors of different characteristics determine how the state implements public policies. This complex process affects foreign policy, since it involves the foreign relations of the state and other policies, particularly in the economic area, such as adjustment, trade and exchange, fiscal, and development strategies. But it also affects social policies, which frequently are not always linked to the economic in Latin American countries. A brief look at the various perspectives on the role
of transnational civil society and non-state actors will help us understand its linkages with the traditional state. It is important to note that in our efforts to incorporate transnational actors into foreign policy analysis, we should make distinctions between domestic and regional civil society and between regional and global civil society. All affect foreign policy but their agendas and styles can be quite different (Serbin 2001).

**Regionalism and Civil Society: Foreign Policy Relevance**

The priority of economic issues in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s and 2000s is reflected in foreign policies that are geared toward expanding trade opportunities bilaterally, regionally, and globally. But in terms of coordinated policy, the regional and sub-regional agendas need special emphasis. In noting the ambiguity of the term “region” and “regionalism,” Hurrell (1994) distinguishes between regional consciousness and identity, regionalization, state-promoted regional integration, and regional cohesion. With respect to foreign policy, the last three are of particular relevance.

“Interstate regional cooperation” implies the negotiation and construction of interstate and intergovernmental agreements. These agreements can reach a high level of institutionalization without necessarily guaranteeing political effectiveness or importance; or they can make way for systems that are more informal, based on international “regimes” (Hurrell 1994: 42). In addition, these agreements or regimes can serve a variety of purposes from coordinated regional positions in international forums and agencies in response to the perception of external threats, to assuring common values or to resolving common problems. “State-promoted regional integration” is a sub-category of the above, referring to specific policy decisions by governments in the sphere of economic integration designed to reduce and eliminate barriers in the mutual exchange of goods, capital, services and people.

“Regionalization” is a more diffuse process, referring to the growth of intersocietal integration in a region and to the frequently non-directed processes of social and economic interaction (Hurrell 1994). Hurrell refers both to the tendencies toward economic integration promoted by market forces, trade and investment flows or company policies without state intervention, and to the flow of populations and shaping of complex social networks through which flow ideas, political attitudes, and ways of thinking, giving rise to a transnational regional civil society. I argue here that this process also has implications for foreign policy.

Hurrell’s concept of “regional cohesion” is also relevant in that it can be understood in two ways: 1) when the region performs a defining role in the relations between the states (and other relevant actors) of that region and the rest of the world; and 2) when the region forms the organizational base for implementation of policies on different issues at a regional level. In this sense, then, foreign policy may emanate from the regional unit itself.

After the Cold War, Latin American and Caribbean nations moved aggressively toward trade liberalization through the enhancement of existing integration mechanisms, notably the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In addition, new movements were established, in particular MERCOSUR (the South American Common Market), and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). By consolidating links among themselves, these nations sought to take advantage of globalization processes while maintaining and eventually strengthening a regional space. The creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1992 between Mexico, the United States and Canada furthered the process in encouraging states to form common negotiating positions and this has been enhanced by the proposed establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. It should be noted, however, that the centrifugal forces of integration have competed with centrifugal forces associated with (among other things) the pressures of globalization, varying levels of external dependence, varying national policies with regard to the pace of liberalization, bilateralism, and the role of transnational corporations in dynamizing productivity, exchange, and external trade in the various sub-regions.

While the various state (or government) and region-unit decisions and policies with regard to integration can be studied through decision making, political economy, or other perspectives (for an example, see Giacalone’s chapter in this volume), the issue of the role of civil society needs to be addressed within a framework that underscores the complex web of relationships between the local, regional, and global levels. Specifically, we need to understand the different agendas, strategies, and linkages between domestic civil society, regional and transnational civil society. These differences are tied in with differing perspectives on the processes of globalization and regionalization.
Global Civil Society

Within the framework of the debate on globalization, the emergence of a global civil society based on the development of non-state networks and linkages, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational social movements, is a phenomenon that is relevant to the understanding of the global dynamic, inasmuch as it transcends the limits and the traditional dynamic of domestic civil societies. Beyond the re-dimensiona-

lizing of the nation-state and the rise of a web of transnational actors basically tied to the global market, the real possibility of regulating and limiting the action of the market like that of a government or intergovernmental organization comes from the development and consolidation of the networks of actors that make up a transnational civil society, in the context of a process of transnationalization that dramatically increases the significance of extra-national factors.

The possibility of correcting and rectifying the process of globalization “from above” where a small number of actors take, frequently with limited or no representativeness or legitimacy, a series of decisions which affect the whole process, necessarily implies the development of global governance. In turn this implies the development of a transnational civil society which promotes and advances the interests of a common citizen-

ry, in the context of a process of citizen participation that some associate with the emergence of a cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1997). It is evident, then, that the establishment of a global or transnational civil society takes to the transnational level many of the suppositions of the politically liberal perspectives, both with respect to democracy and the role of civil society. Especially in the latter case, it tends to transfer uncritically the liberal discourse of civil society and its function in the context of the democratic governance of a country to a discourse on global civil society that is frequently permeated by anti-state positions (Pasha and Blaney 1998). But transnational civil society is not necessarily just engaged in liberal lobbying nor it necessarily completely anti-state.

In the first place, there is a continuing debate about the importance of global civil society and different perspectives on the issue depends on how one views the process of globalization itself. “Skeptics” (according to McGrew [1998]’s useful classification) believe that what is underway today is not a globalization process but rather an intensification of the internationalization of the world economy, in which national economies (particularly the most powerful ones) are still hegemonizing the international economic dynamic. In this perspective, globalization is perceived as a myth, since the world economy continues to be characteri-

zed by a division of power and labor (Ferrer 1997) in a transition from internationalization to transnationalization, but without producing an effective globalization of the international economy. As an illustration, the skeptics invoke the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, which mainly affected the emerging economies and, in the final analysis, was favorable to the more developed economies (Ferrer 1997). Also for many skeptics, given growing international inequalities, exclusions, and asymmetries, the consolidation of an international system hegemonized by the industrialized countries is making way for the reactive development of ethnic, religious, and national fundamentalisms and particularisms that call into question the intended imposition of western civilization in the global process (Huntington 1996). They contribute more to fragmenting the world system into blocs than to homogenizing it and creating a global society. For these skeptics, there is no emerging global civil society as neoliberalists contend. Just as there are no transnatio-

nal processes not controlled by states, so there is no developing civil society outside the frontiers of the nation-state which, consequently, might have a relevant influence on the international system. This is certainly the case with respect to the positions taken by some Latin American governments with avowedly “statist” orientations, given the traditional weakness of national civil societies in Latin America.

Colás for example (1997), postulates that before the current unfolding of the process of globalization, an international civil society was emerging historically, originally comprising social movements of long standing, for example the labor movement or peasant movements which transcend national frontiers in their activities but which originally emerged in the national environment. Similarly, Peterson (1992) points to the existence of an international civil society comprising a variety of social actors operating across the frontiers of various integrated countries, in which states and actors are strongly linked and the autonomy of the social actors depends to a large extent on the policy of the states.

On the other hand, what McGrew calls “globalists” (neoliberal as well as marxist/post-marxists) view globalization as a final phase of the development of capitalism with respect to the configuration of a global market imposed on the nation-state. The process is fundamentally economic, has a global reach and, depending on the ideological affiliation of the respective authors, can be perceived optimistically or pessimis-

tically. The optimistic view is the “end of history” and the creation of a world governed by market logic, with its political links associated with liberalism, as in the case of Fukuyama, Ohmae, or Guehenno. The pessimis-

tic position identifies the imposition of the logic of capital accumulation at a world level and increased
contradictions and inequalities in the international system, as found in the analyses of Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, or a more profound historical approach in the case of the evolution of Wallerstein’s “world system.” Based on diverse ideological perspectives, globalists see the globalization process as either engendering the emergence of a third sector—global civil society—in the framework of a new articulation of the state-market-civil society trilogy on a world sphere, or as making way for the spread of counter-hegemonic social forces on a global scale.

“Transformationalists” also view globalization as a new phenomenon but insist on a more multidimensional and complex vision of the changes wrought by globalization. To them, globalization is a new process in the history of humanity, is occurring rapidly, is plagued with uncertainties and turbulence, is hard to pin down and forecast, and is framed by new linkages among economic actors, nation-states and social actors at a global level (Rosenau 1990 and 1997). In this perspective, global civil society, which each author sees with different nuances, is an important emerging actor in the context of the heterogeneity and complexity of a multicentric international system. For some, globalization from above promoted by nation-states and market actors is triggering the progress of “globalization from below” by a global civil society articulated by NGOs and transnational social movements (Falk 1995a and 1995b) that require the development of new forms of global governance.

For both globalists and transformationalists, global civil society, like globalization itself, is a new phenomenon, with novel identifying traces which privilege the role of the networks that are emerging in the context of “new social movements” (environmental, gender, human rights, peace and international justice) (Shaw 1994; Lipschutz 1996). These “new movements” are not based on social classes but on views and interests grounded in more specific and focused global issues (Shaw 1996: 14). They are also less preoccupied with traditional politics if not with power; less tied to the mobilization of the masses, and more narrowly focused on lobbying and impacting public opinion through specific campaigns. As such, global civil society constitutes, consequently, a level of non-state action that has grown in visibility and presence in the international system, leading to the emergence of a global conscience, and the reconfiguring of the global political space as an increasingly democratic one (Pasha and Blaney 1998: 425).

In this view, with various shades of difference, often the conceptions of a global civil society are associated with three elements: a) a critical vision of the role of the state against which civil society (including global) is conceived as having varying degrees of autonomy and, in the final analysis, antagonism; b) an idealized and optimistic vision of civil society which frequently ignores its contradictions, fragmentations, and internal tensions, particularly in the context of a process of globalization marked by inequality, social and geographic exclusion, and civil society’s difficulties in articulating and pushing through large-scale societal projects; and c) the perception of the hegemonic validity of the modalities of liberal democracy in the context of the irreversibility of the process of globalization and an uncritical vision of the structure of world power (Pasha and Blaney 1998).

Along these lines, conceptual development has focused on the emergence of transnational advocacy networks not necessarily linked or identified with social movements. These are best viewed as communicative structures for interchange emerging out of social networks. These networks seek to structure and frame political opportunities through information policies and campaigns in which massive means of communication play a relevant role (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In this view, the vision of the role of governmental and intergovernmental organizations (and of the state in general) is more nuanced insofar as it postulates, on the basis of empirical analysis, the possibility of development of a variety of links and alliances between the different state agencies and transnational actors. A more recent development in this regard is the articulation between a focus on global public goods—identified basically in terms of equity and justice, market efficiency, the environment and cultural patrimony, health, knowledge and information, and world peace and security (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999)—and an analysis of global public policy networks, with the introduction of

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7 References in this paragraph are to Fukuyama 1992; Ohmae 1995; Guéhenno 1995; Cox 1987; Gill 1993; Wallerstein 1995.
8 Lipschutz gives two basic reasons to justify the notion of global civil society conceived as “the self-conscious construction of networks of knowledge and action, by decentralized, local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of states as though they were not there.” His reasons are: first, “that there is not one, but many heteronomous transnational political networks being established by and among actors within civil society who themselves are, in a sense, ‘imagined communities,’ and who are challenging and changing, from below the nation-state system”; and second, that “the growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct world politics” (Lipschutz 1996: 102). In this he agrees with Shaw who notes that what makes civil society global is “global politics” (Shaw 1994: 655).
9 An interesting element in this concept of transnational advocacy networks is the fact that although it is not reduced to NGO activists, they can bring together, in the final analysis, government functionaries, politicians, and the media in a linkage based on issues which transcend the divisions between civil society and government per se (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
new issues on the global agenda, the establishment and negotiation of new standards, the recompilation and dissemination of knowledge, and the overcoming of the participatory gap, among other things (Reinicke and Deng 1999).

One conception that is most associated with the visions of the transformationalists postulates the emergence of a specific transnational civil society which includes both old and new social movements and NGOs, taking into account different levels of interaction and scope, different agendas and aims, and different methods of mobilization and political action in the local, national, sub-regional, and regional arenas, in addition to the global. In this regard, new political spaces are being defined, composed of networks based on economic, social, and cultural relations, spaces occupied by the conscious association of actors, in locations that are physically separated, who are linked among themselves into networks with particular social and political aims (Lipschutz 1996: 104).10 This is taking place in the framework of world politics and not only the process of economic globalization.

A Conceptual Synthesis

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the skeptics' view of the absence of a global civil society is belied by the formation in recent years of a strong network of civil society agencies that transcend the domestic boundaries. But although “global civil society” and “transnational civil society” have often been used interchangeably, the former may be a misleading term. My own view is that transnational civil society is a more useful concept because it can more easily understood as framing differentiated action at different levels, that is the local, sub-regional, regional and global levels.

First, a distinction must be made between domestic civil society and transnational civil society. Many of the views of global/transnational civil society are based on a predominantly descriptive vision of a national civil society which just so happens to transcend the domestic sphere in its actions. But analytically, it is not feasible to equate domestic societal processes with those of transnational civil society. I will therefore try to highlight from a conceptual perspective what is unique about transnational civil society in the context of globalization. After this, I will focus on the importance of a regional conception of civil society in Latin America.

Transnational, versus domestic: Particularly in the context of the global dynamic, transnational civil society assumes a series of characteristics that are different from the traditional conception of domestic civil society as any form of social organization that is not associated either with the state or with profit-making enterprises. In this respect, although it can potentially contribute to regulating, alongside the state, the dynamic of the market, it also contributes to limiting the action of the state itself within an extremely complex set of interrelationships of levels, spheres of interaction, and actors. Transnational civil society is not engulfed by the state, as is domestic civil society. It does not need to have the nation-state as its only target and interlocutor. It does not interact with a specific territoriality or sovereignty and so it is not state-centric (Lipschutz 1996). And yet, despite the dominant anti-state discourse and the limitations of many states particularly in the global south, these states and their agents continue to be the main focus of the actors of transnational civil society.

But this transnational civil society is also not engulfed by the market, like a third private non-profit sector that is merely philanthropic, as some neoliberalists claim. Rather, transnational civil society can be conceived as the web of networks of activities organized by groups and individuals who may be sharing certain services or trying to influence and improve society as a whole, without being part of a government or enterprise (Jorgensen 1996: 34) but still remaining in a necessary relationship with them both.11

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10 While the participants in the networks of global civil society interact with states and governments over particular policy issues, the networks themselves extend across levels of analysis and state borders, and are not constrained by the state system itself (Lipschutz 1996: 104).

11 Although we make use here of the traditional trilogy of state, market, and civil society, it can be pointed out, with implications for the global south, that the trilogy of state, market, and civil society has also been extensively criticized as coming from an ahistoric and culturally detextualized viewpoint which promotes a particular model of society based on western concepts of democracy. As Trivedy and Acharya note: In one sense, the trinity framework is an ideological expression of the globalisation of the market economy. In trying to undermine the positive side of the role of the state in the South, it undermines the sovereignty of less developed nations. In trying to subsume everything under the western-liberal notions of what is civil and democratic, it undermines local history, culture and alternative paths of development. In so far as it obfuscates the structural distinction between the social groups – classes, castes, ethnic groupings, gender differences and other dimensions and by submerging these differences under the rubric of civil society – it tends to undermine the poverty-focused and rights-based approaches which have been the avowed hallmark of many development agencies (Trivedy and Acharya 1998: 58).
Transnational civil society interacts on the one hand, with different government interlocutors (government agencies, diverse intergovernmental organizations, political decisionmakers, functionaries, and technocrats), which it seeks to influence in order to increase its participation and to push through public policies that accord with its interests, and on the other hand with market forces (transnational corporations, multilateral financial institutions, and private international banks) which it seeks to limit and regulate. Also as noted earlier, transnational civil society works at multiple levels — the local, sub-regional, regional, and global. But in the main, the targets of civil society at the regional and global levels are intergovernmental if not supranational, as is the case of the institutions of the European Union, or as seen in 1999-2001 in the anti-World Trade Organization mobilizations of Seattle, or those in Washington against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, or those in Genoa against the Group of Seven.

Also, in contrast to the dynamic of domestic civil society, transnational civil society involves special spaces and spheres of interaction, particular methods of advocacy and policymaking, and varied links to political parties, syndicates, and national and regional legislatures in the framework of representative democracy. Although transnational civil society possesses a higher level of autonomy vis-à-vis domestic political spaces and more specifically the state, it still keeps the governments and intergovernmental organizations as privileged interlocutors, and also focuses on different expressions of national political societies, for example regional parliaments and international party groupings.

In addition, unlike domestic civil society, transnational civil society involves a highly sociopolitical dimension of citizen action by way of its interaction, dialogue, and confrontation with other relevant public actors in the international system on transnational issues and on a global social agenda formed in the context of the promotion of forms of global democratic governance. In this regard, it generates the development of interconnected political spaces that transcend national and territorial frontiers, and which therefore are not contained—different from domestic civil society—by the national state, nor by a defined territoriality. These interconnected political spaces at the regional and global levels point to the development of a transnational democratic governance that promotes forms of political accountability on the part of transnational as well as national actors involved in the dynamic of the international system. However, each sociopolitical dimension implies likewise distinctive positions and strategies with regard to the existing structure of power, and significant variations in the possibilities of political advocacy in accordance with social and geographic position.

**Transnational versus global**: The claim of the emergence of a global civil society is often associated with an optimistic view of the role of agents in social transformation. But when we speak of transnational civil society, we recognize that it is not homogeneous. Rather, it consists of a very complex web of networks and actors which are not necessarily convergent and which often are torn by internal fragmentation and the existence of deep-seated tensions and contradictions. Transnational civil society is not comprised only of social movements (“old” like the worker or peasant movement; and “new” like the environmental or gender organizations); and it cannot be reduced to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are only the intersocietal “tip of the iceberg.” However, NGOs are often key actors, since more than the traditional social movements which mobilize masses or sectors, they tend to prefer lobbying, media exposure and advocacy as forms of political action, and they do not seek to accede to power but rather to advocate with it. NGOs bring up specific issues and are closer to the new social movements in their reclamation of identities. In this process they need to maintain a dialogue and to engage in multiple strategic alliances with state actors, political society, and the actors of the market. Also NGOs have an especially great capacity for media visibility. In this respect, an important component to take into account in the composition of transnational civil society is the communication media which channel and express many of the demands of the different sectors, and contribute to influencing the political decisionmakers with regard to issues on the regional and global agenda (Shaw 1996).

In addition to its diversity, transnational civil society is differentiated by the agenda of its various sub-units. Frequently the agendas of social actors working in the developed countries do not coincide with the agendas of those working in the developing countries. Also there are differences among the social actors of the developed countries, as reflected in the Seattle demonstrations against the WTO in 1999 which brought together labor wanting protectionist platforms, environmentalists seeking conservationist programs, and anarchists confronting the state.

Transnational civil society includes therefore diverse networks, frequently with imprecise contours — “new” and “old” social movements, NGOs, epistemic communities, media and communications networks, and so on. It is at once contradictory, heterogeneous, and laden with tensions since it comprises diverse actors and sectors which have aims that stretch beyond national negotiation. In fact, it is not possible to consider the process of the growth of transnational civil society outside of the context of inequalities, exclu-
sions, and contradictions engendered by the very process of globalization, both in social and geographic terms, beyond the aspiration of the member movements and organizations to promote issues of a global nature and to consolidate the mechanisms of democratic governance on a world scale.

Finally, transnational civil society is more transnational than global because it includes sub-regional and regional networks and webs that do not necessarily associate themselves with global agendas and which link the global with the transnational (regional or global) in a particular manner. In this respect, transnational civil society often reflects characteristics of the domestic and local civil societies involved, in terms of their relationship with the state (that is, political cultures). This is so because global events are processed across regional, national, and local cultures in such a way as to throw into question any view of total homogenization. In turn, given this heterogeneity, transnational civil society implies a “globalization from below” in search of regulating and regimenting the activities of other actors in the international system.

Regional Civil Society: The differential articulation mentioned above at distinct levels and in distinct areas gives rise also to the emergence of a regional civil society as a part of the dynamic interaction of transnational civil society in the international system, but guided by regional objectives and themes. These objectives build on strategies and forms of policymaking framed in the context of national political cultures.

In Latin American and the Caribbean, regional civil society has focused, with mixed success, on impacting the sub-regional and regional processes of integration, often questioning the creation of free trade areas but also searching for participation and political advocacy of social agendas. The regional issues and social agendas that are formulated are not necessarily linked with global agendas, and are promoted in contexts that can be but are not necessarily antagonistic to governments (for a more elaborate discussion see Serbin 2001). Regional civil society seeks to advocate with national foreign policy agencies and with intergovernmental organizations, particularly those whose agenda is relevant to regional concerns. For example, in the Greater Caribbean sub-region, one of the leading mouthpieces for civil society is the Caribbean Policy Development Center (CPDC) formed in 1991. It is an umbrella body that represents a network of NGOs from the insular Caribbean (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic), Belize, and Guyana. The CPDC sits together with the Caribbean Congress of Labor and the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce in a regional consultative council formed by the governments of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as a way to effect greater consultation with social partners (Byron and Girvan, 2000). In the context of the many sub-regional and hemispheric integration initiatives that have been taking place, dialogue is ongoing among national civil society groups within their regional umbrella organizations, regional civil society groups with regional and international organizations, and national and regional civil society groups with non-governmental development organizations in the north (Byron and Girvan, 2000). Moreover, the CPDC is able to interact with its counterparts in Central American and elsewhere through the Greater Caribbean Civil Society Forum created in 1997 and various regional and hemispheric consultation forums. In sum, these organizations are all oriented towards increasing civil society’s, and particularly citizens’, influence on decision, processes regarding public policies. They are looking for the improvement in the standards of open information, transparency, and accountability that characterize democratic political systems. The political methodology of these organizations mostly is oriented to lobbying and the development of information campaigns as means of influencing powerful actors.

The Latin American and Caribbean region also has its share of civil society organizations that are anti-globalization with links to similarly-positioned global social movements. Both the advocacy and anti-globalization trends have been clearly reflected in the FTAA negotiating process. For example, at the third FTAA summit in Quebec in 2001, after a broad consultation process, a number of groups chose to advocate through the organization of a hemispheric consultation mechanism involving a variety of NGOs and organizations in the different countries. The final document that was presented to the governments meeting in Quebec advocated specific points related to the greater involvement of civil society and citizens in decisionmaking with respect to the FTAA. On the other hand, trade unions and anti-free trade organizations held a parallel People’s Summit in Quebec. This Assembly of the Peoples of the Americas seriously questioned the objectives of the entire FTAA process, claiming that this process goes against the interests of significant sectors of the Americas population and that, in this regard, there was no point in presenting any alternatives to the government representatives at the summit. While parts of the consultation document presented by the first group reached the final draft of the Summit Declaration, the Assembly of the Peoples of the Americas rejected any attempt to establish a dialogue with the government representatives. In the final analysis, of course, state and regional foreign policies are most likely to be influenced by advocacy initiatives than by anti-globalization agendas. However, the latter still need to be taken into consideration as they may have an indirect impact on what governments say and do and how they frame their actions.
It may be added that in general, the possibility of influencing both global and regional processes is more reduced if the influence attempt comes from the south rather than the north. NGOs and global social movements from the north clearly have more knowledge, information, and resources to establish and promote global agendas than their counterparts do in the south. Therefore, more often than not, the agenda of south civil society and social movements is strongly conditioned by the north. This does not contradict what was said previously about the differences between global and regional agendas. It is important to note that, in general, regional issues are not relevant for northern organizations and movements, unless they are strongly related to global issues. From this point of view, sometimes is very difficult for southern organizations and movements to raise resources and disseminate information with regard to regionalization and to define their own agendas regarding global issues. As a consequence, even intersocietal networks are, more often than not, conditioned by the North-South gap (Serbin 2001).

Conclusion

The study of Latin American foreign policy has at various times emphasized the role of external actors, power considerations and capabilities, regime structure, decision making, and more recently, political economy perspectives. I have argued here that the recent accelerated globalization processes suggest that we also need to take into consideration foreign policy initiatives with respect to free trade and regional integration, given the heightened importance of such issues in Latin America and the Caribbean today. As we seek to frame these issues appropriately, a case is made that there is a need to deal with the increasing impact of non-state actors and civil society, especially regional civil society which interacts in a selective (and conditioned) manner with global civil society as well. Taken together intersocietal initiatives promoted from the diverse regional and sub-regional webs of civil society (“from below”) as well as those from the intergovernmental and multilateral agencies (“from above”) highlight the emergence of a series of networks of regional civil society with distinctive characteristics, which are engendering greater participation in the intergovernmental processes from above or an articulation with national processes. It should be noted, however, that this is an incipient movement which has only recently begun to link up, with respect to some specific issues, with wider movements of transnational civil society, and which are not necessarily following its dynamic and orientation at the global level. Much more work needs to be done to clarify conceptually and empirically the impact of the political activity of the numerous organizations which have put forward demands and claims of a regional character, linked to particular strategies and methods of intervening in decision making in the sphere of both public policy in general and, more specifically, foreign policy. Among third world regions, Latin American and the Caribbean, with its focus on integration and political liberalization is a good place to start. Whether this focus can apply as well in time to the rest of the global south remains to be seen.
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Cuba en el extorno regional: las relaciones con América Latina y el Caribe en el cambiante contexto regional

A principios de 1999, dos sucesos diferentes galvanizaban la atención de las autoridades cubanas y, en especial, de Fidel Castro. Por un lado, la realización, en La Habana, del 2do. congreso sobre globalización que reunía a varios centenares de funcionarios y representantes de organismos regionales y multilaterales, a economistas y a destacados intelectuales de diferentes partes del mundo junto con un permanente seguimiento y participación del propio Fidel Castro y, por otro, la movilización por el retorno a Cuba del balserito Elián González, retenido en Miami por sus parientes. Ambos hechos, y las reacciones frente a ellos, sintetizaban y simbolizaban, para el momento, algunos de los lineamientos más importantes de la política exterior cubana luego del colapso del bloque soviético y el difícil período de adaptación que lo sucedió.

Por un lado, la persistencia de una visión *globalista* desarrollada en las condiciones favorables de la Guerra Fría y la necesidad de dar seguimiento, en el contexto de un entorno distinto al de la confrontación entre Este-Oeste, a la dinámica del cambio global y a las posibilidades que pudiese abrir para una inserción distintiva de Cuba en el sistema internacional, sin que la búsqueda de una nueva forma de inserción implica-ra la introducción de cambios políticos en la isla. Para lo cual no sólo era necesario desarrollar un seguimiento y un análisis de la situación mundial con el concurso de los mejores especialistas, sino también aprovechar la oportunidad para reforzar y profundizar espacios de participación y estrechar lazos con diversos organismos regionales y multilaterales, agotando todo el espectro posible de espacios internacionales accesibles para lograr una inserción de Cuba en la dinámica mundial.

Por otro lado, la percepción de que el principal obstáculo a vencer en este proceso era la continuidad de la política aislacionista de EEUU hacia la isla más allá de la Guerra Fría y, en particular, el papel de la comunidad cubano-americana en el mantenimiento y desarrollo de esta política, componentes siempre presentes en la política exterior cubana desde la década del sesenta.

Ambos elementos son fundamentales a la hora de intentar comprender la actual orientación de la política exterior cubana. El primero, en tanto apunta, básicamente, a seguir identificando los espacios e interlocutores para una necesaria diversificación económica y política de su actividad y orientación exterior y, a la vez, la exploración de posibles alianzas que refuerzen su posición frente a EEUU, sin afectar el sistema político establecido por la Revolución. El segundo, porque sigue identificando claramente a la política de EEUU como el principal obstáculo para el desarrollo de una política exterior activa por parte de Cuba, en manifiesta articulación con la incidencia de un factor político interno representado por la capacidad de presión e influencia política de la comunidad cubano-americana en EEUU.

Ambos elementos son también cruciales para comprender la nueva visión del entorno geopolítico que orienta la política exterior cubana en la actual coyuntura, en particular en el ámbito de las relaciones con América Latina y el Caribe.

Para ello, sin embargo, y en primer lugar, hay que ubicar las nuevas condiciones en las que se desarrolla esta política, tanto en lo interno como en lo externo.

El fin de la Guerra Fría y la desaparición de la Unión Soviética: impactos en Cuba.

En este sentido, después de la desaparición del CAME y del bloque soviético, junto con el desmoronamiento de una serie de mecanismos de apoyo financiero y comercial a la isla, se desató una crisis económica en 1991 que llevó a una contracción de la economía cubana en los tres años subsiguientes. Luego de que la crisis económica consecuente alcanzara su nadir en 1993, la progresiva recuperación de la economía

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2 En este marco, como señala el analista cubano Carlos Alzugaray, los principales objetivos de la reinserción de Cuba en el sistema internacional pasan por su seguridad nacional, fundamentalmente definida en función de prevenir que EEUU logre el aislamiento de la isla, y por el desarrollo económico, básicamente orientado a la búsqueda de socios comerciales y de inversores.

3 Font, Mauricio “Friendly Prodding and Other Sources of Change in Cuba”, 1997
cubana ha dado lugar a una gradual estabilización en el marco del “período especial en tiempos de paz” que, de acuerdo a la CEPAL, se expresa en un crecimiento económico sostenido en los últimos años⁴. Desde esta perspectiva, y en función de un modelo mixto de atracción de inversiones extranjeras en diversos sectores, la recuperación económica se ha articulado asimismo, con la posibilidad de medir y ajustar el eventual despliegue de medidas económicas internas orientadas al reforzar las actividades económicas no-estatales.

A la par de la progresiva recuperación económica, sobre la base de una apuesta a la diversificación económica y política en sus relaciones exteriores y a la atracción de inversiones extranjeras, junto a las eventuales aperturas en la economía interna, situaciones como la retención de Elián Gónzalez en EEUU, han posibilitado una fuerte reactivación de la movilización política en torno a las tradicionales banderas nacionalistas y anti-norteamericanas y a un mayor control sobre las disidencias políticas.

Este cuadro interno se articula con un entorno internacional dinámico y cambiante. Por un lado, la diversificación de relaciones políticas llevó, luego del fin de la Guerra Fría, a una contracción y a un redimensionamiento de la política exterior cubana mas acorde a sus alcances actuales, y a una focalización en la multiplicación de espacios de inserción, en lo económico⁵, pero también en lo político, que sirviera para contrarrestar el principal obstáculo para la supervivencia de la isla – el embargo de EEUU y las políticas consecuentes de presión hacia Cuba.

Por otra parte, tanto las relaciones con los países miembros de la UE como Canadá fueron, en el mundo desarrollado, algunos de los referentes más importantes en una nueva estrategia de relaciones con el Norte industrializado, a lo largo de la década del noventa, como contrapeso significativo a la situación de antagonismo con EEUU. Sin embargo, en los últimos años, las presiones de estos actores hacía una transformación y una apertura progresiva del sistema político cubano y en particular el tema de los derechos humanos y políticos en la isla, han generado una reversión del proceso, particularmente si tomamos en cuenta los casos de España y de Canadá. En este contexto, el balance entre las necesidades de diversificación de relaciones, la profundización de acuerdos económicos y la atracción de flujos financieros y comerciales con los países industrializados, por un lado, y la resistencia a las presiones externas para introducir reformas políticas, ha sido un componente particularmente complejo de la política cubana en la década del noventa.

En el marco de la estrategia de diversificación de relaciones y de la búsqueda de alianzas internacionales que facilitaran la reinserción de Cuba en el sistema mundial luego del fin de la Unión Soviética⁶, el capital acumulado en décadas anteriores de vínculos con los países en vías de desarrollo del Sur, también ha sido ampliamente explotado, quizás con mas éxito que en las relaciones con los países industrializados, en tanto existe una mayor identificación de problemas comunes en torno al desarrollo a enfrentar en un escenario internacional signado por la globalización, y menos presiones y demandas en torno a las situaciones domésticas. En este sentido, tanto las relaciones con los países asiáticos y, en especial con China, han ido ampliándose progresivamente, culminando con la reciente visita del Premier chino a Cuba y la visita oficial, en mayo de este año, de Fidel Castro a varios países asiáticos y del Medio Oriente⁷, como en especial, las relaciones con América Latina y el Caribe, espacio regional que, a partir de la crisis de principios de la década del noventa, ha comenzado a ser nuevamente privilegiado en la política exterior de Cuba. El rol asumido por Cuba en años anteriores en el Movimiento de Países No-Alineados (NOAL) y en el Grupo de los 15, ha sido un factor nada desdénable a la hora de capitalizar estas relaciones con el mundo en vías de desarrollo y, como veremos mas adelante, a la hora de comenzar a diseñar, con algunos aliados regionales, una nueva visión de la dinámica internacional frente a EEUU.

Las relaciones con América Latina y el Caribe: la dimensión multilateral.

Dónde quizás se hace mas evidente la capitalización de las relaciones desarrolladas en el marco del globalismo característico de la política exterior cubana en las décadas previas y el nuevo sesgo regional asumido en la década del noventa, es en el caso del Caribe y de América Latina. En este marco, es de señalar que, a lo largo de la década del ochenta, la proyección global de la política exterior cubana, puso en

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⁴ A este respecto la CEPAL señala un acelerado crecimiento económico en los últimos años, cuya proyección, de acuerdo a The Economist, puede ubicarse en un 4,5% para el 2001 y un 5,5% para el 2002.
⁵ En búsqueda de inversiones extranjeras y mayores flujos de intercambio comercial exterior.
⁷ Argelia, Irán, Qatar y Malasia.
En este sentido, en primer lugar, en la década del noventa, se produce una revalorización de la importancia de las relaciones con los países del Caribe anglofono y se genera una activa política hacia la CARICOM, luego del impasse y el distanciamiento generados en la década del ochenta luego de la inversión norteamericana de Grenada en 1983. En este contexto, junto con el restablecimiento de relaciones con Grenada, Barbados y Jamaica, países con los cuales el distanciamiento había sido mas evidente, se reactiva la comisión mixta Cuba-CARICOM y se produce un acercamiento a este organismo regional en función de una eventual incorporación de Cuba al mismo y, a la vez, a través de la CARICOM de un relacionamiento eventual con la Unión Europea a través de la CARIFORUM, para aquel momento embarcada en la renegociación, en el marco del grupo de países ACP, del acuerdo de Lomé con la Unión Europea. Mas allá de que este proceso se ha visto coyunturalmente detenido en meses recientes, en lo que a Cuba respecta, generó en los últimos años de la década del noventa, una resonancia evidente tanto en términos de la re-inserción de Cuba en espacios y foros multilaterales regionales dónde no estuviera participando EEUU. Por otra parte, esta orientación inicial hacia una mayor presencia en los espacios, foros y mecanismos multilaterales estuvo fuertemente condicionada por la búsqueda de una diversificación de vínculos económicos externos, en el marco de la difícil situación por la que atravesaba la economía cubana y en función de una nueva valorización de las relaciones Sur-Sur, mas al alcance de las restricciones impuestas a la proyección global cubana luego de la desaparición de los apoyos desde el bloque de Europa Oriental.

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La AEC en tanto plataforma política y ámbito de concertación económica, sin aspirar a ser, a diferencia de otros esquemas, un acuerdo de libre comercio, se constituyó en un espacio particularmente propicio para la reinscisión regional de Cuba, en un ámbito en dónde no participa EEUU y en dónde las condiciones se prestaban a una participación activa capitalizando un papel destacado en la dinámica regional orientada hacia la cooperación. La concepción estratégica mas recientemente introducida en la AEC, de generar en la región una zona de cooperación se articuló, en este sentido, cabalmente con los intereses cubanos de participar en espacios colectivos regionales sin necesariamente comprometerse en iniciativas de liberalización comercial o en acuerdos de libre comercio inspirados en el NAFTA. En este marco, Cuba contribuyó de una manera marcada al desarrollo y potenciamiento de la AEC, apoyando activamente su desarrollo sobre la base de las alianzas y vínculos establecidos tanto con los países del Caribe como con el Grupo de los Tres (México, Colombia y Venezuela), principales promotores de la iniciativa, tanto por razones económicas como geopolíticas luego del vacío geoestratégico generado en la región con el fin de la Guerra Fría y la definición de una nueva agenda de seguridad regional por parte de EEUU, y de las incertidumbres generadas por NAFTA y la ausencia de iniciativas que dieran paridad a la Iniciativa de la Cuenca del Caribe favorable a los intereses de las pequeñas economías regionales. Adicionalmente, la participación en la AEC contribuyó a reforzar la presencia regional activa de Cuba a través de potenciar, en el marco de los vínculos con los países del Caribe anglofono y, mas recientemente, con República Dominicana, el apoyo a su participación en la Asociación de Estados del Caribe (AEC).

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yó a un acercamiento coyuntural con los países centroamericanos con los cuales, luego de la crisis de los ochenta y de la derrota electoral del sandinismo en Nicaragua, las relaciones estaban caracterizadas por el distanciamiento y la frialdad, cuando no por el antagonismo.

La capitalización de las alianzas regionales en el Caribe, sirvió también para reactivar el papel de Cuba en el Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) que, si bien en la década del noventa sufrió un significativo proceso de deterioro por la progresiva dilución de su rol de mecanismo de consulta y concertación económica entre los países de América Latina y el Caribe en el marco de una coyuntura dónde el foco en la cooperación Sur-Sur había sido desplazado por otras prioridades y por el interés de los países más grandes de avanzar los diferentes esquemas de integración, seguía constituyendo un espacio atractivo por la ausencia de una participación norteamericana. El fuerte énfasis en la mas activa incorporación y participación de los países caribeños y centroamericanos en este organismo, junto con el papel que desempeñó en el apoyo a la creación de la misma AEC, convirtieron para que Cuba reforzara su participación en el mismo y para que, en los últimos años, prestará un apoyo significativo para que este organismo no desapareciera. De hecho, es de señalar en este proceso en los últimos años, el fuerte rol y el peso específico de los países centroamericanos y caribeños (Cuba incluida) para lograr dar una nueva funcionalidad y orientación al organismo, particularmente en función de la ausencia de una orientación mas definida por parte de los más activos países del Grupo de Río.

La relación con el Grupo de Río y la participación en las Cumbres Iberoamericanas – dos ámbitos particularmente relevantes para el relacionamiento con los países mas grandes de América Latina - estuvieron fuertemente signadas por la actitudes de los países latinoamericanos frente al tema de la democracia, en especial en el marco de los procesos de redemocratización y consolidación democrática que atraían a algunos de ellos. A principios de la década, predominó, en el seno del Grupo y de los países latinoamericanos en general una posición proclive a la reinserción de Cuba en la región y una crítica manifiesta a las presiones de EEUU (y en particular, en coincidencia con los países europeos, el cuestionamiento a la ley Helms-Burton) junto con una actitud vaga y ambivalente frente al tema de los derechos políticos y la democratización de la isla, con algunas notables excepciones como el caso de Argentina, identificada en forma explícita, durante los gobiernos de Menem, con un cuestionamiento del sistema cubano. Esta actitud latinoamericana fue cambiando gradualmente en los últimos años y, en particular, luego de la Cumbre Iberoamericana de La Habana, cuando el énfasis, sin abandonar las críticas a EEUU, se acentuaron en relación con la situación política interna en la isla y los derechos humanos. La culminación de este proceso se evidenció, por un lado, en el respaldo a la condena a la situación de los derechos humanos en Cuba en la reunión de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra, a principios del año en curso, y a las frecuentes controversias y críticas del gobierno cubano a las actitudes de El Salvador, Argentina, Guatemala y Costa Rica en el transcurso de los últimos meses.

Por otra parte, la creciente presencia cubana en la región de la Cuenca del Caribe, no se disoció de una serie de iniciativas en los ámbitos multilaterales en donde participaban mas activamente los países latinoamericanos mas grandes. Esto se hizo particularmente evidente con la incorporación de Cuba, en 1998, a la ALADI, que posibilitó una relación económica con países latinoamericanos de economías complementarias y no necesariamente competitivas como en el caso de la Cuenca del Caribe, además de generar un clima propicio para la reinserción política de Cuba en el escenario latinoamericano.

**Las relaciones bilaterales y los cambios en el entorno regional.**

La participación activa en los espacios multilaterales a nivel regional, no sólo se articuló con el objetivo de establecer y profundizar un espectro de alianzas y acercamientos políticos útiles para contrarrestar la política de aislamiento a la que Cuba había sido sometida en años anteriores en el ámbito regional y potenciar nuevas modalidades de inserción en la comunidad regional, sino también para avanzar en el proceso de profundización de la diversificación de vínculos e intercambios económicos, tan necesarios para relanzar la economía del país luego de la situación creada por la desaparición del CAME.

En este sentido, es de destacar la importancia creciente asignada, en la década del noventa, a Canadá y México como socios comerciales de la isla, tanto en lo que se refiere a la provisión de inversiones en distintos campos (pero particularmente en el turístico, en la última década) como destino de exportaciones de bienes y servicios y fuente de importaciones. Pero junto a estos dos países, se destacan, a principios de la década, Argentina como un importante exportador de bienes a la isla y, a finales de la década, Venezuela,
a través del acuerdo de asistencia energética firmado con el gobierno de Hugo Chávez con Cuba\textsuperscript{15}.

En este contexto, lo que es importante resaltar, es el cambio generado en el entorno regional por la emergencia del bolivarianismo y de Chávez en Venezuela y sus efectos positivos para la economía cubana y para el despliegue de un rol renovado de la diplomacia cubana en la región. En este sentido, la profundización del acercamiento de Venezuela con Cuba a raíz de la victoria electoral de Hugo Chávez trae una serie de correlatos importantes en la dinámica regional y, en especial, en la situación de Cuba.

En primer lugar, es de señalar que los acuerdos entre Venezuela y Cuba y, en particular, la provisión de 53,000 barriles diarios de petróleo venezolano a este último país\textsuperscript{16} (un tercio de su consumo) por cinco años, en condiciones preferenciales de pago y con la posibilidad de su reventa a precios internacionales, implica, necesariamente, una inyección financiera crucial para la economía cubana, sin contar algunas ventajas adicionales vinculadas al intercambio de profesionales y servicios como parte del pago de la deuda así acumulada.

Pero más importante aún, la estrecha relación avanzada en los últimos años entre Cuba y Venezuela y, en especial, entre sus dos mandatarios – Fidel Castro y Hugo Chávez (quien ha hecho expresa reiteradas veces su admiración por el dirigente cubano), tiende a reconfigurar el entorno regional y la dinámica tanto de la Cuenca del Caribe como del conjunto de América Latina, en la coyuntura actual.

En este sentido, es de hacer notar, la reorientación general de la política exterior venezolana desde la asunción de Hugo Chávez Frías a la presidencia, en un sentido eminentemente geopolítico dónde los recursos petroleros son utilizados para promover un cuadro de alianzas que pueda contrarrestar, por lo menos en lo que señalan los discursos del presidente venezolano, el peso de la hegemonía estadounidense. En el diseño bolivariano que sustenta esta política, las aperturas hacia una incorporación de Venezuela en MERCOSUR, la simpatía (cuando no el apoyo) implícito o explícito a la guerrilla colombiana y las reacciones frente al plan Colombia promovido por EEUU, y la asistencia y cooperación a los países de Centroamérica y el Caribe, junto a un fortalecimiento de la OPEP y de los vínculos con los países árabes, China y Rusia, entre otros, intenta configurar un nuevo esquema regional e internacional que algunos analistas (y en particular algunos investigadores cubanos) no dudan en identificar con una visión neobolivariana de la integración, con exclusión de EEUU por oposición al panamericanismo promovido por éste país y sus aliados regionales, percibido como un esquema de sometimiento geopolítico de América Latina a los intereses norteamericanos.

En esta perspectiva, el planteamiento es muy evidente en términos de privilegiar la relación con Brasil, como factor de contrapeso regional a EEUU y, en particular, a la iniciativa del ALCA – percibida como parte del proceso neoliberal de globalización, en función de la generación de un polo integracionista alternativo. En este marco, el eje Caracas-La Habana se convertiría en un factor decisivo a la hora de aglutinar fuerzas frente a la hegemonía norteamericana, reforzado por el desarrollo de diferentes movimientos sociales a lo largo y a lo ancho del continente, en coincidencia con los señalamientos del Foro de Sao Paolo.

Mas allá de la viabilidad política de este cuadro en un mundo globalizado y caracterizado por una arquitectura del poder compleja y cambiante, en términos de actores y de procesos, lo cierto es que la alianza entre La Habana y Caracas, en función de la creación de un polo alternativo de poder, por mas que incipiente e inicialmente frágil, favorece, en la coyuntura actual, una oxigenación necesaria para Cuba, particularmente en el marco de una agudización de las tensiones con EEUU después de haber asumido George W. Bush la presidencia de este país (mas allá de los cambios que, en términos de política exterior, pueda generar la recomposición política reciente del Senado de EEUU), y de un deterioro de las relaciones con los países europeos y Canadá a raíz de sus críticas a la situación política interna. En este sentido, si bien no amplía el espectro de diversificación de relaciones económicas y políticas, abre la posibilidad de reactivar y ampliar su esfera de influencia y eventualmente su liderazgo a nivel regional, a través de la recuperación de la capacidad mobilizadora en torno a una serie de banderas tradicionalmente impulsadas por la revolución cubana y actualmente aggiornadas a la crítica al proceso de globalización y los presupuestos neoliberales que lo sustentan.

En este contexto, es necesario tener en cuenta, que históricamente las relaciones de Cuba con los países de América Latina se caracterizaron por fases en donde éstas se canalizaron a través de los vínculos con actores políticos específicos y no necesariamente a través de los gobiernos respectivos, particularmente en la fase en que las relaciones diplomáticas estaban suspendidas con la mayoría de ellos. En este

\textsuperscript{15} Para mas detalles de la evolución de las relaciones comerciales de Cuba con los países de América Latina, ver Erisman, op. Cit.

\textsuperscript{16} Convenio Integral de Cooperación entre la República de Cuba y la República Bolivariana de Venezuela.
sentido, la eventual apuesta al liderazgo de Brasil no está desvinculada de la crecientes posibilidades de una próxima victoria electoral del PT y de su líder Lula da Silva en ese país, y las relaciones con otros países latinoamericanos no dejan de estar teñidas por los vínculos y nexos con prístas y perredistas en México, o, salvando las diferencias de escala e incidencia, de radicales y frepasistas en Argentina. Mas allá de los acuerdos de protección de inversiones firmados con México y del contacto personal con Fox, subsisten dudas acerca de que la nueva administración mexicana suscriba muchos de los principios de la previa y que Cuba siga ubicada en la posición que antes ocupaba en la política exterior mexicana. De una manera similar, la votación en Ginebra en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos a favor de una condena de la situación de derechos humanos en Cuba por parte del gobierno argentino, mas allá de las reacciones, del intercambio de invectivas y del enfriamiento de las relaciones diplomáticas que haya podido generar en los últimos tres meses, deja en claro cuáles son las prioridades de Argentina (y cuáles son sus preocupaciones) a la hora de considerar el rol de Cuba (y de Venezuela) en la región y en relación con el MERCOSUR.

Un balance tentativo: la “desnorteamericanización” imposible.

La Cumbre del ALCA en Québec, en abril de este año, ha evidenciado hasta que punto la búsqueda de una reinscripción de Cuba en el concierto regional sigue sin disociarse de la impronta de la relación con EEUU y de la articulación con la dinámica global, mas allá de la contracción de la política exterior de Cuba luego del fin de la Guerra Fría y su focalización en la búsqueda de alianzas y de diversificación de sus vínculos políticos y económicos en el ámbito latinoamericano y caribeño. El ataque explícito de Bush, durante ese evento, a Cuba y la reacción de Fidel Castro, de crítica a la globalización y al neoliberalismo y de apoyo a los movimientos anti-globalización que se despliegan, con particular fuerza, desde la reunión de la OMC en Seattle en diciembre de 199917 y que asimismo se hicieron presentes en Quebec, constituyen un episodio más de este proceso, donde el eje de la confrontación entre EEUU y Cuba persiste, mas allá del fin de la Guerra Fría, como un elemento determinante en la configuración e implementación de la política exterior cubana.

En este proceso, las relaciones con los países de América Latina y del Caribe, independientemente de la búsqueda de un inserción económica regional en una etapa de difícil transición para la economía cubana, siguen fuertemente signadas por los avatares de la relación de Cuba con EEUU, como componente primordial, y por una visión de las oportunidades y desventajas que ofrece el cuadro global para mantener una inserción relevante en el sistema mundial. La emergencia del régimen bolivariano en Venezuela otorga eventualmente, en este marco, un espacio renovado para la presencia cubana en la región y para el desarrollo y profundización de nuevas alianzas en el plano global. Sin embargo, su evolución posterior queda, precisamente, condicionada por las eventuales reacciones de EEUU, dónde el nuevo gobierno republicano tiende a reforzar una política de presión y aislamiento sobre Cuba.

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17 Dierckxsens, Wim (2000) “La construcción de alternativas al neoliberalismo a partir de Seattle”, en Pensamiento Propio (Managua), No. 11, enero-junio.